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ABSTRACT 33 
 34 
Patients with schizophrenia show reduced cooperation and less sensitivity to social cues in 35 
pairwise interactions, however, it remains unclear whether these mechanisms are also present 36 
in interactions within social groups. We used a public goods game to investigate cooperation and 37 
sensitivity to social feedback in group interactions in 27 patients with schizophrenia and 27 38 
healthy controls. Participants played 20 trials in two conditions: 1) no fine: participants had the 39 
choice of investing into the public good (i.e. cooperating) or not (i.e. defecting), 2) fine: 40 
participants had the same choice but defectors could be punished by the other players. On the 41 
first trial, patients invested less in the public good than healthy controls. In the no fine condition, 42 
controls decreased their investments over time, but patients did not. The possibility of being 43 
fined for defecting and actually being fined led to significantly higher cooperation in both groups. 44 
This shows that the groups were equally sensitive to social feedback. Our findings suggest that 45 
patients tend to approach social group interactions with less cooperative behaviour, which could 46 
contribute to social dysfunction in daily-life. However, an intact sensitivity to social enforcement 47 
and feedback indicates that patients can adjust their behaviour accordingly within a group. 48 
 49 
1. Introduction 50 
 51 
Social cognitive skills are crucial for the development of cooperation and trust in interpersonal 52 
relationships (Fett et al., 2014; Kishida et al., 2010; Sutter and Kocher, 2007). There is ample 53 
evidence that patients with schizophrenia demonstrate impairments in social cognition (Couture 54 
et al., 2006; Fett et al., 2011; Green and Leitman, 2008; Green et al., 2008; Penn et al., 2008; 55 
Pinkham et al., 2003; Savla et al., 2012); and that these impact on illness outcomes (Couture et 56 
al., 2006; Fett et al., 2011; Penn et al., 1996). Social dysfunctions are also reflected in some of the 57 
key positive and negative symptoms of the disorder, such as paranoia, social withdrawal and lack 58 
of (social) motivation (Penn et al., 2008). In daily life, social interactions pose a challenge for 59 
patients (Billeke and Aboitiz, 2013; Couture et al., 2006; Penn et al., 1996), reflected in patients’ 60 
difficulties maintaining relationships with family or friends (Burns and Patrick, 2007; Pinkham and 61 
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Penn, 2006). In studies using neuro-economic exchange games to examine social interactions 62 
directly, demonstrated that patients tend to show lower levels of trust towards others (i.e. 63 
cooperate less) (Fett et al., 2016; Fett et al., 2012; Gromann et al., 2013), compared to healthy 64 
individuals, and are less likely reciprocate in interactions (Berg et al., 1995; Sigmund, 2007, 2010). 65 
Lower levels of trust were associated with more severe psychotic symptoms in chronic psychosis 66 
(Fett et al., 2012; Gromann et al., 2013). Moreover, in these pair-wise interactions, patients did 67 
not adjust their behaviour after receiving information about the other player’s trustworthiness 68 
(Fett et al., 2012), suggesting lower sensitivity to social feedback, which is in line with earlier data 69 
showing that patients are less sensitive to interpersonal cues (Corrigan and Green, 1993; 70 
Johannsen, 1961). While these two-person games can help to enhance the understanding of the 71 
dynamic nature of pairwise interactions, modelling social dilemmas in groups provides additional 72 
information because social interactions often occur among more than two individuals 73 
simultaneously (Archetti and Scheuring, 2012) and the signals of more people need to be 74 
interpreted simultaneously leading to a greater complexity in the social dynamics (Brandt et al., 75 
2003; Sigmund, 2007). 76 
One approach to examine group dynamics during cooperation and sensitivity to feedback 77 
from others is offered by the public goods game (PGG). In this paradigm, a social dilemma is 78 
given: participants have to make a choice between maximizing the benefits across a group at a 79 
cost to their personal payoff, or maximizing their personal payoff at the expense of the group. 80 
Players are given an initial endowment and have to make the decision whether to invest the 81 
money in a group account (cooperating/public good) to mutual benefit or whether to keep the 82 
money for themselves (defecting/private good) yet still benefit from the others contributions. A 83 
key variable underlying cooperation in the PGG is trust (Balliet and Van Lange, 2013). If a player 84 
chooses the private good, his return exceeds that of the players who invested into the public 85 
good (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004); this represents “free riding” (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; 86 
Wischniewski et al., 2009). When players are allowed to punish those who free ride, investments 87 
in the public good increase as cooperation is socially enforced (Brandt et al., 2003; Fehr and 88 
Gächter, 1999, 2002). While fining another player is mostly done out of anger or spite, there is a 89 
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cost attached to this - players have to pay to punish a defecting player, which makes this an 90 
altruistic act, a form of punishment at a personal cost (Brandt et al., 2003; Seymour et al., 2007). 91 
To date, only one study has used the PGG to investigate group interactions in 92 
schizophrenia (Chung et al., 2013). They found higher levels of cooperation in patients compared 93 
to controls in a PGG without punishment (i.e. not examining social feedback). The authors 94 
concluded that patients played the game in a non-strategic way and demonstrate a reduced 95 
sensitivity to loss. However, the results are difficult to compare as the authors manipulated the 96 
utilized game to have 2 possible outcomes, group success or failure (success if 3 or more out of 97 
the 5 players in the game cooperated, otherwise failure), which enforced a higher rate of 98 
cooperation. More importantly, they did not include changes in cooperation over time. They also 99 
had groups exclusively of patients, which tends to amplify group differences. Therefore, their 100 
utilized PGG did not tap into the same processes as our PGG design. 101 
We describe the first study to use a neuro-economic group interaction game to 102 
investigate behaviour in social groups in schizophrenia, using the PGG, incorporating a measure 103 
of sensitivity to social feedback. We were interested in three key elements: 1) baseline level of 104 
cooperation on the first trial, where participants do not have any information on the other 105 
players’  behaviour, 2)  behavioural change in response to others’ behaviour, 3) behavioural 106 
change when players were able to punish other players – to investigate whether cooperation can 107 
be enforced and to examine sensitivity to social feedback. Based on expected illness reduced 108 
social cooperation, on some of the key symptoms of the disorder (e.g. paranoia and distrust) and 109 
on previous results from trust game studies we hypothesized that patients with schizophrenia 110 
would demonstrate: a) lower levels of baseline cooperation and lower mean cooperation in the 111 
PGG, b) less sensitivity to social feedback indicated by less difference in cooperation between 112 
conditions (i.e. social enforcement) and less adjustment in behaviour after being fined in the 113 
preceding trial as compared to controls (i.e. sensitivity to social feedback). We hypothesized a 114 
negative association between symptoms (positive and negative), cooperation and sensitivity to 115 
social feedback in patients. Positive symptoms are related to social abnormalities and deficits in 116 
social decision making and trust. Negative symptoms such as social withdrawal, isolation, social 117 
anhedonia, social amotivation have strong social components. 118 
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 119 
2. Methods 120 
 121 
2.1 Subjects 122 
Twenty-seven outpatients with schizophrenia and twenty-seven healthy controls were included 123 
in the study. Patients were recruited from the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust 124 
and healthy controls subjects were recruited through local advertising. Demographic information 125 
is displayed in Table 1. Inclusion criteria for all participants were 1) age between 18-55 years old, 126 
2) sufficient understanding of the English language to successfully perform the task and to 127 
understand the informed consent, 3) no learning disabilities, 4) absence of a neurological 128 
condition, 5) no alcohol/drug dependence within the last six months, 6) absence of a major 129 
physical illness or motor, hearing or speech difficulties. For the schizophrenia group additional 130 
inclusion criteria were 1) a diagnosis of schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder or psychotic 131 
disorder according to the ICD-10 criteria, 2) stable under their current treatment (> 6 weeks). The 132 
patients who were included had the following diagnoses without any comorbidity: 20 133 
schizophrenia, 5 schizoaffective disorder, 1 psychotic disorder, 1 polymorphic psychosis with 134 
schizophrenia. All patients were medicated, with 85% treated with atypical antipsychotics. 135 
 136 
2.2 Measures 137 
Symptoms - To assess symptom severity in patients the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale 138 
(PANSS) (Kay et al., 1987) was used. The PANSS is a semi-structured interview that assesses 139 
symptoms over a two-week period prior to the testing session. Thirty items are scored to 140 
evaluate the severity of psychopathology: 1 = absent, 2 = minimal, 3 = mild, 4 = moderate, 5 = 141 
moderate to severe, 6 = severe to 7 = extreme. In the current study, the PANSS subscale scores 142 
were used to get estimate of positive symptom severity (range 7-49) and negative symptom 143 
severity (range 7-49). The positive and negative scale have good concurrent validity and good 144 
internal reliability (respectively Cronbach’s α = 0.62-0.73 and α = 0.83-0.92 (Kay et al., 1987; 145 
Peralta and Cuesta, 1994)).  146 
 147 
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2.3 Estimated cognitive ability - To control for possible influence of cognitive ability on group 148 
differences in behaviour in the PGG, an estimation of cognitive ability was assessed with the 149 
vocabulary subtest of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) (Wechsler, 1999). 150 
The Vocabulary subtest has a total of 42 items, where subjects are required to define and 151 
describe the words best to their knowledge. Words are presented orally and visually. The WASI 152 
vocabulary test gives a good estimate of overall intelligence scores, the vocabulary subtest 153 
showing a 0.87 correlation with the full WAIS III (Axelrod, 2002). T-scores were converted to 154 
scaled WASI scores (range 20-80). 155 
 156 
2.4 Experimental design 157 
A binary public goods paradigm was used to investigate cooperation and sensitivity to others’ 158 
social feedback in a group setting. Subjects participated in two three-player games involving one 159 
of two conditions; 20 trials in the no fine and 20 trials in the fine condition. Before the start of 160 
the game, participants were informed that they were playing all 40 trials with the same two 161 
opponents who were participating on computers that were connected via the Internet. In reality, 162 
they were playing computers (player 2 and player 3) that were programmed with stochastic 163 
algorithms that mimicked human choices. The study was coded in Adobe Flash (see (Reimers and 164 
Stewart, 2015), and was adapted from a version of the PGG in which participants genuinely 165 
played against other real player over the internet. As such, plausibility of playing with other real 166 
people was kept high. In the no fine condition, player 2 was programmed to play a tit-for-tat 167 
strategy (see, e.g., Axelrod, 1980); meaning player 2 would cooperate on all trials, except 168 
immediately following a trial on which the other two players did not cooperate. Player 3 was 169 
programmed to play a locally self-interested strategy, defecting on all trials. In the fine condition, 170 
players 2 and 3 used the same strategies as in the no fine condition. Both player 2 and 3 171 
cooperated if they were punished in the preceding trial. Player 2 punished any player that 172 
defected on two consecutive trials. Player 3 never punished other players. To make the strategies 173 
used by the virtual players less transparent, players played their dominant strategy 80% of the 174 
time and a random 20% of the time the opposite strategy. 175 
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In the no fine condition, participants received an initial endowment of £3. They then had 176 
to make a choice whether to keep the money for themselves (invest in the private good; i.e. free 177 
riding) or to put their £3 in a public good (invest in the public good; i.e. cooperation). They made 178 
this choice before seeing the other players’ decisions. At the end of the trial, the contribution of 179 
each player was revealed, and the money contributed by the three players was summed then 180 
doubled and the total amount was divided equally among all players, regardless of whether they 181 
cooperated or not. The next trial started again with £3 for each player.  182 
The fine condition was identical to the no fine condition, however, after participants made 183 
their choice and had been informed about how the other players had invested, they were then 184 
given the option to punish the players who did not cooperate. To punish another player was 185 
costly, since £1 was deducted from their own total amount and £2 was deducted from the total 186 
of the fined player. So, punishing another player was only possible at a cost to themselves. 187 
The task was presented in an animated way, presenting 3 players seated around a table, 188 
the procedure of the game is visually shown in Figure 1.   189 
 190 
2.5 Procedure 191 
All participants were invited to the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, where 192 
testing took place. Trained MSc level researchers carried out the testing session and a research 193 
nurse administered the PANSS interview. Prior to participation subjects were given written 194 
information about the content of the study and what would be expected from them. It was 195 
emphasized that their participation was voluntary and they had the opportunity to withdraw at 196 
any moment without any consequences. The study was approved by the Bromley Research Ethics 197 
Committee. All participants signed informed consent before testing. 198 
After completing a questionnaire on demographic information, participants played the 199 
PGG (the no fine condition first, followed by the fine condition) on a laptop in a web browser, 200 
which initially showed a loading message and a connecting message for the other players. After 201 
a few connection attempts, the system displayed that all players were connected and the task 202 
was launched. Plausible variable delays were used for the responses of the other players, so that they 203 
did not necessarily appear immediately after the participant made a choice. After completing the 204 
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experimental task the PANSS interview was conducted. At the end of the session, subjects 205 
received an incentive of £10 for participation in the study. 206 
 207 
2.6 Statistical analyses 208 
Statistical analyses were performed using STATA version 14 (StataCorp, 2015). We examined 209 
group differences in demographics using t-tests and chi square tests. Logistic regression analyses 210 
were performed to investigate the differences between groups in baseline cooperation 211 
(investment on the first trial) and multilevel mixed effects logistic regression analyses to 212 
investigate the differences in mean cooperation, changes in cooperation over trials, punishment 213 
(i.e. frequency of fining other players) and social sensitivity to punishment (i.e. change in 214 
behaviour after being fined) between groups and between symptoms and cooperation within the 215 
patient group, taking into account possible effects of a-priori confounders (gender and age). The 216 
same analyses were run to investigate within group effects of condition in baseline cooperation 217 
and mean cooperation (i.e. representing social enforcement). Separate analyses were conducted 218 
to investigate group differences within each condition and the condition effect within each 219 
group, as the full model omitted essential variables due to dichotomous outcome and predictor 220 
variables. 221 
 222 
3. Results 223 
 224 
3.1 Demographics 225 
Demographic information and clinical characteristics are shown in Table 1. There were no 226 
significant differences between groups in age and gender. There was a trend towards significant 227 
differences between groups in estimated cognitive ability, with patients having a lower estimated 228 
cognitive ability than healthy control subjects. 229 
 230 
3.2 Group differences on baseline and mean cooperation by condition 231 
Task performance per group and condition is shown in Table 2 and are displayed in Figure 2. In 232 
the no fine condition, there was a significant difference in first-trial cooperation between groups 233 
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with patients showing lower cooperation, OR = 0.18, 95% CI (0.04; 0.89), p = .04, but no significant 234 
difference in mean levels of cooperation (p = .23). In the fine condition, there was a similar trend 235 
effect towards a difference in cooperation between groups, OR = 0.20, 95% CI (0.03; 1.19), p = 236 
.077, but mean levels of cooperation throughout the game did not differ (p = .53). 237 
 238 
3.3 Changes in cooperation over trials 239 
PGG performance changes over repeated trials are shown in Figures 3a (no fine condition) and 240 
3b (fine condition). There was a trend towards group differences in change in cooperation over 241 
trials in the no fine condition, as indicated by the interaction between trial number and group, 242 
OR = 1.05, 95% CI (1.00; 1.10), p = .065. Analyses by group showed a significant change in 243 
cooperation in the healthy control group (OR = .94, 95% CI (0.91; 0.97), p < .001), but not in the 244 
patient group (p = .34). 245 
In the fine condition the change in cooperation over time was not different between 246 
groups, as indicated by the non-significant interaction between trial number and group (p = .86). 247 
In the model without the interaction, the main effect of group on cooperation was also non-248 
significant (p = .43), however, there was a significant main effect of change of cooperation over 249 
trials (OR = 0.96, 95% CI (0.94; 0.98), p = .002). 250 
 251 
3.4 Effect of social enforcement on cooperation within groups 252 
Within the healthy control group there was no significant difference in the percentage 253 
cooperation on the first trial between conditions, p = 1.00. However, controls showed a 254 
significant difference in mean levels of cooperation between conditions, with cooperation being 255 
higher in the fine than no fine condition, OR = 1.60, 95% CI (1.22; 2.10), p = .001. 256 
In the patient group, there was no significant difference in percentage baseline 257 
cooperation between conditions, p = .55. Similar to healthy controls, patients showed a 258 
significant difference in the mean levels of cooperation throughout the game between 259 
conditions, with cooperation being higher in the fine than no fine condition, OR = 1.84, 95% CI 260 
(1.39; 2.44), p < .001. 261 
 262 
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3.5 Sensitivity to social feedback and punishing behaviour 263 
The likelihood of cooperation after being punished by another player for free riding did not differ 264 
between groups, p = .58, see Table 2 for percentages of cooperation. Groups also did not show 265 
any differences between cooperation after defecting but not being fined by another player (p = 266 
.67) and no differences in cooperation after cooperating in the previous trial (p = .52). Healthy 267 
controls and patients did not differ in the frequency of punishments given to other players, p = 268 
.74. 269 
 270 
3.6 Correlations between (baseline) cooperation and symptoms within the patient group 271 
No significant association between positive and negative symptoms and baseline cooperation 272 
was present in either condition (no fine condition: p = .38 p = .59, fine condition: p = .57 and OR 273 
p = .90, respectively). 274 
There was a significant interaction between positive symptoms and change in cooperative 275 
behaviour over trials in the no fine condition (OR = 1.01, 95% CI (1.00; 1.02), p = .05). To examine 276 
the interaction in more detail, we divided the patients into three groups based on the positive 277 
symptom severity (PANSS Group 1; N = 9, M = 12.33, SD = 1.76, PANSS Group 2: N = 7, M = 15.57, 278 
SD = 0.5 and PANSS Group 3: N = 7, M = 21.29, SD = 2.97). These results are plotted in Figure 4, 279 
demonstrating that patients with the most severe positive symptoms (PANSS Group 3) increased 280 
their level of cooperation throughout the game compared to healthy controls and patients in the 281 
PANSS Groups 1 and 2. This interaction effect was not found in the fine condition, p = .95, and 282 
also no main effect of positive symptoms in the model without the interaction (p = .26), but there 283 
was a main effect of cooperation over trials (OR = 0.96, 95% CI (0.93; 1.00), p = .05).  284 
There was no significant interaction between negative symptoms and trial number on the 285 
likelihood of cooperation in the no fine condition and the fine condition, respectively p = .63 and 286 
p = .31. There was no main effect of negative symptoms in the no fine condition (p = .99), nor in 287 
the fine condition (p = .51). There was no main effect of cooperation over trials in the no fine 288 
condition (OR = 0.99, 95% CI (0.95; 1.02), p = .42), but this was significant in the fine condition 289 
(OR = 0.96, 95% CI (0.93; 1.00), p = .05). 290 
 291 
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All analyses were repeated with IQ as a covariate in the model. Due to many missing values in IQ, 292 
we used a multiple imputation-based procedure to re-create the individual missing scores. This 293 
yielded slightly different parameter results, however, significance did not change and the 294 
direction of the effect remained the same. 295 
 296 
4. Discussion 297 
 298 
This study examined cooperation and sensitivity to social feedback in schizophrenia in a PGG, to 299 
measure the dynamics of social group interactions. Our findings on baseline cooperation show 300 
that patients are less cooperative at task onset. However, patients did not differ from controls in 301 
their reaction to social enforcement or sensitivity to social feedback (i.e. punishment). 302 
Patients have lower initial inclination to cooperate in social groups, as indicated by a lower 303 
level of baseline investments into the public good compared to healthy controls. This finding is 304 
in line with evidence from pairwise interactions, where patients show less basic trust (Fett et al., 305 
2012; Gromann et al., 2013). To engage in social interactions, one has to trust the other person’s 306 
willingness to cooperate, which seems to be a key precursor in the development of cooperation 307 
in a public goods dilemma (De Cremer, 1999). Patients may choose more selfishly in a PGG 308 
compared to healthy controls, because they are less trusting due to negative beliefs about other 309 
individuals. Another possible explanation is that patients with schizophrenia are more self-310 
oriented, due to a reduced ability to take the perspective of others (Sprong et al., 2007). 311 
Change in behaviour over trials was different between groups in the condition without 312 
fining, but not in the condition where cooperation was socially enforced. Healthy controls started 313 
out with high levels of cooperation and then decreased their cooperation over trials, which is in 314 
line with previous findings on cooperation in a public goods paradigm, cooperation in multi-shot 315 
public goods games tends to be high initially and then declines throughout the game (Andreoni, 316 
1988; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Ledyard, 1995). This can be explained 317 
by a game-theoretic view: the allocation of the public good is equal no matter what amount each 318 
individual invests, thus, to maximize one’s own profit, the dominant long-term strategy is to 319 
defect (Andreoni, 1988). A possible explanation for decreasing cooperation could be that 320 
participants are reluctant to invest into the public good because of fear that others are not going 321 
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to contribute as well. This is called inequity aversion. In the beginning of the game, healthy 322 
participants may be more willing to take a risk, or are more trusting in others’ good will compared 323 
to patients. However, when their contributions are not routinely reciprocated, this feeling of 324 
inequity overrides the willingness to cooperate (De Cremer, 1999; Kurzban et al., 2001). The 325 
decline may also be related to a self-serving bias (Fischbacher et al., 2001). Patients’ motivation 326 
to defect may be based on a lack of trust due to fear of uncooperative behaviour of others. 327 
Another possible explanation could be that patients value monetary reward in a different way 328 
than controls do, which could be related to impulsive choices (Heerey et al., 2007) and 329 
amotivation (Fervaha et al., 2013). 330 
Adding the option of punishing another player for free riding increased the likelihood of 331 
cooperation within both groups compared to the condition where fining was not allowed. 332 
Although this is in line with previous findings in healthy subjects, who tend to increase 333 
cooperation when the punishing of free riders is allowed (Brandt et al., 2003; Fehr and Gächter, 334 
2002), this was in contrast to our expectations in the patient group. We anticipated that patients 335 
would be less sensitive to social enforcement by introducing the possibility of fining others, due 336 
to patients’ deficits in processing social information. The findings suggest that patients are 337 
sensitive to social enforcement. Moreover, there was an increase in cooperation after defecting 338 
and being fined for it: in healthy controls from 12.80% to 45.10% and in patients from 13.72% to 339 
44.83%. This change in behaviour was similar in both groups, indicating that patients did not 340 
show the expected reduced sensitivity to social feedback. There is some evidence from other 341 
studies for unimpaired sensitivity to punishment in schizophrenia (Cheng et al., 2012). In pairwise 342 
encounters a reduced sensitivity, i.e. no changes in trust, was shown after providing information 343 
about the trustworthiness of the other player (i.e. top-down processing) (Fett et al., 2012). In our 344 
study patients had to use bottom-up processing to deduct the social information (i.e. learning 345 
trial-to-trial in the game). It might be that problems arise when patients have to use top-down 346 
processing of social information specifically (integration of a priori information) and not when 347 
patients use bottom-up processing of social feedback that is data-driven.  348 
Patients and controls demonstrated the same amount of punishing behaviour, which is in 349 
line with results in pairwise interactions in dictator game with punishments (Wischniewski and 350 
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Brüne, 2011). These findings suggest that patients are sensitive to social rules and willing to 351 
altruistically punish other players to reinforce social norms at the same level as healthy control 352 
subjects. 353 
Interestingly, positive symptoms were only associated with the level of cooperation over 354 
trials in the no fine condition. Patients with more severe positive symptoms showed an increase 355 
in cooperation over time, compared to reduced cooperation in the lower symptom groups and 356 
the healthy control group. An inability to estimate the risk of loss (Pedersen et al., 2016; Shurman 357 
et al., 2005) and reduced sensitivity to unfairness (Agay et al., 2008; Csukly et al., 2011) might 358 
explain why patients in the highest symptom group in our study increase their level of 359 
cooperation instead of decreasing this behaviour. It is possible that the higher level of 360 
cooperation in our study is related to making choices without fully contemplating the best 361 
strategy. In accordance with previous studies these abnormalities in behaviour in the PGG may 362 
reflect aberrant reward processing (Juckel et al., 2006a; Juckel et al., 2006b; Nielsen et al., 2012; 363 
Schlagenhauf et al., 2008) and reward learning (Gold et al., 2008; Murray et al., 2008; Strauss et 364 
al., 2014; Waltz et al., 2013). This should be interpreted with caution due to the small sample 365 
sizes in the three symptom groups. However, the possibility of being punished resulted in an 366 
appropriate behavioural adjustment in patients with more severe positive symptoms. It is not 367 
possible to be definitive about the reason for this aberrant behaviour without social 368 
enforcement, which may be contributed by a lower sensitivity to other people’s choices or lack 369 
of cognitive flexibility. It would therefore be interesting to investigate this association with 370 
specific clusters of symptoms and cooperation in group interactions in future studies. 371 
There are limitations in this study. First, the PGG in this study was a binary 3-player game, 372 
this choice was made for task simplicity, either an investment in the private or the public good; 373 
incorporating continuous investment opportunities may have made the game more sensitive to 374 
changes in social enforcement and feedback. Second, the punishment in our study was 375 
potentially low; a free riding player punished by a cooperating player would still receive £3 (i.e. 376 
the initial endowment) if the other 2 players cooperated; a flexible level of punishment could 377 
have greater influence on behaviour. Last, we did not differentiate between medication type, 378 
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although the majority of patients were on atypical antipsychotics. Future studies have to 379 
systematically investigate the possible roles of medication and stage of the illness are. 380 
This study is the first to investigate cooperation, social enforcement and sensitivity to 381 
social feedback in group interactions in schizophrenia. Although all effect sizes were small, our 382 
findings suggest that patients demonstrate a tendency to initiate social group interactions with 383 
less cooperative behaviour, which may set a negative tone in social settings, potentially 384 
contributing to social difficulties in initiating interactions in real life functioning. However, the 385 
results clearly suggest that social enforcement and sensitivity to social feedback are intact, which 386 
indicates that it may be possible for patients adjust their social behaviour accordingly during 387 
repeated social interactions. This may be particularly important for interventions that target 388 
social skills and suggests that group-based interventions may be particularly helpful. The study 389 
would benefit from replication, since this is the first study to investigate cooperation and 390 
sensitivity to social feedback in this manner. It would be interesting to extend this work into social 391 
group interactions in real time and to use neuroimaging, to test the underlying neural 392 
mechanisms. 393 
 394 
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Figure legends 525 
 526 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the binary public goods game: a) no fine condition and a+b) 527 
fine condition; a) participants could cooperate (black arrows) or free ride (light grey arrow), a 528 
choice made without knowing the other players’ decisions. The amount in the public good was 529 
doubled and split equally among all players (grey arrows), b) The players who cooperated could 530 
fine (punish; grey arrows) the players who free rode after receiving information on the other 531 
players’ decisions. Costing the fining player £1, but deducting £2 from the free riding player. 532 
 533 
 534 
Figure 2. Group and condition comparisons for baseline cooperation and overall mean 535 
cooperation in the multi-round binary public goods game. The error bars depict the dispersion of 536 
cooperation over all trials within groups and conditions. † p < 0.08, * p < .05, ** p <= .001 537 
 538 
 539 
Figure 3: Cooperation per trial in the multi-round binary public goods game in the a) no fine 540 
condition, and the b) fine condition. 541 
 542 
 543 
Figure 4. To visualize the interaction effect found between positive symptoms and change in 544 
cooperation over trials within the patient group, 3 groups for symptom severity were made. 545 
Change of cooperation over trials by positive symptom severity are plotted in the no fine 546 
condition. 547 
 548 
 549 
 550 
 551 
 552 
